2014 Wfstar - Yarnell hill fire

on june thirtieth 2013 19 firefighters died on the yarnell fire in central Arizona Southwest a press kit the Granite Mountain interagency hotshot crew from the press kit Fire Department was working West yarnell when they were overrun by fire within the fire area the terrain varies from steep ridges to nearly flat valley bottoms with numerous rock outcroppings temple trip I'll the dominant vegetation type shop /url brush ranged in height from one to 10 feet in some places was nearly impenetrable on June 16 2013 a fire behavior advisory discussed critically low fuel moisture and increased fuel loading the drought severity index so the fire area as being in extreme drought on Jan 29 2013 one day before the entrapment above-average loading up your graph and drought stressed feels combined to allow for faster moving buyers with or without win in for increased buyer intensities inflame link yarnell Hill Fire area had not experienced wildland fire since 1966 the fire started late the afternoon of june 28 2013 when thunderstorms moved through the area and it made multiple fires the fire which was under the jurisdiction and responsibility up the Arizona State Forestry Division was approximately 1/2 acre in a boulder field in steep terrain the state did not put firefighters on the hill that night due to safety concerns on the morning of the 29th the type for incident commander orders retardant from single-engine air tankers attempting to box in the fire between a two-track Road on the east side and the bridge to the north the fire had grown to roughly two acres helicopter transport seven firefighters to the fire perimeter early in the day to begin constructing him mine the fire hall too well it made a when it 1600 increasingly and elevate fire activity by early evening the fire jumped the two-track rodin east flank and becomes the sixth acre fire during the evening the fire continues to grow weather conditions impede the use the deviation to deliver retardant when the fire region approximately 100 acres in size the incident command request a tape to incident management team there's concern that people's Valley and yarnell may be threatened if it burns to the northeast in the next twenty-four to 48 hours on sunday june thirtieth a 700 briefing occurred at the journal fire station with the incident command members at the incoming team and the Granite Mountain I each the superintendent the briefing covers potential tactics the previous night spot weather forecast and radio frequencies the use Google Maps on an iPad to review the area the border Springs Ranch is pointed out all as an excellent safety zone they discuss strategies for the north side of the fire estimated to be 300 to 500 acres and for keeping buyer at aviano by improving old roads really out a strategy to establish an incur on the south end they also agree that the Granite Mountain superintendent will take division alpha and that his assistant superintendent will run the crew division after this I'm is to establish in anchor point at the heel the pyre using direct or indirect tactics as appropriate division alpha skull to head up the crew as the hike about 45 minutes along the to trap road to the Eagle Point just below a saddle from there divisional for scouts out the west side of the bridge short squad a few crew members follows him working along the fire's edge port a cold part in the fire to establish the incur point on the east side buyer activity picks up a bit and the rest at the Crucible the parents of the two track road keeping peace with the fire as incoming resources arrive they are directed to the model Creek School in people's Valley where the incident command post is being established the incident commanders provide another briefing around 9:30 the formal transfer command occurs by radio at 10:22 several resources are immediately assigned after the briefing to keep homes from burning and model Creek and an evacuation notice for that area issued around 10:45 during the same period the in her point is completed by a squad at Granite Mountain on the west side the bridge division alpha meet face to face with the Blue Ridge superintendent and assistant superintendent near the incur point they discuss tactics problems with radios and placing a lookout near old grader at the bottom up the slope the Blue Ridge supervisors weepy incur point and deliver the Granite Mountain Lookout at the greater at 12:39 the fire is pushing north toward structures that people's Valley and backing at granite mountains location Granite Mountain beaches are Brock faith intakes lunch around 13:30 after eating the crew works back reinforcing their line as they go making sure their anchors solid lookout by the greater has trigger point established for the crew and for himself in case the fire changes direction the Granite Mountain captain lookout and others talk over the radio about thunderstorms coming in the captain mention he might seen a few lightning strikes in the distance at 1402 the National Weather Service calls the fire to advise them that a thunderstorm Easter fire could produce wind gust a 35 to forty-five miles per hour this is really to the fire line but the winds from the storm did not develop over the fire area at 15:26 the national weather service calls to advise the fire the thunderstorms have move north-northeast at the fire and then outflow boundary has formed is outflow boundary is moving toward the fire and could potentially produce north northeast wind at forty to fifty miles per hour this message is also relate to the fire line operations double-checked that division alpha also heard the second weather update division alpha acknowledges the weather update in mentions the wins are getting squarely on the bridge but that everyone is in the black in a good spot between 15-30 in 1545 the fire experiences a gradual with shipped from the southwest to the west Northwest the fire becomes berry active with some spotty by this time two-mile flanking fire looks more like a head fire and is starting to move in a more self easterly direction is when ships occurred ahead of the arrival but the outflow boundary this radar data was recorded as the storm outflow boundary arrived at the north end of the fire at 16 18 around 1550 the Granite Mountain assistant superintendent holds the lookout to relieve the weather update the lookout acknowledges looks around and notices the fire has started building and the wind is starting to shift because the assistant superintendent and says the fire has hit his trigger point and he's moving back to the old greater area the assistant superintendent replies calmly okay cool the Blue Ridge superintendent picks up the Granite Mountain Lookout near the old greater and delivers him to the vehicle's the Blue Ridge superintendent then goes for more drivers to get the rest of the vehicles moved on the way out from moving all of the vehicles structure protection group supervisor contact the Blue Ridge superintendent to ask if the dozer line still option to burn out from the answer is No divisional for hearing the transmission agrees and says the fire has reached the area were granite mountains crew carriers were a moment later division of urself I wanna pass on that we're going to make our way to our escape route blue bridge tries to clarify by asking you guys are in the black correct division of a response yeah we're picking our way through the black and then mentions road in the bottom and going out toward the ranch Blue Ridge thinks divisional for is talking about heading north East too cold black to a branch there yeah division upper to confirm you're talking about the road he saw me on with the you TV earlier in the bottom division after replies yes the road I saw you on with the UT be from this point on granite mountains motivation in path were unknown all resources on the fire and we will never know their exact route the available information interviews time evidence a probable route and best probable fruits suggest the following: after 1604 the crew began moving from the flank of the fire where they had been working near the inca point the traverse the to track road near the top of the ridge and proceeded felt along the ridge until they reached a saddle as they traveled along the ridge they had full view up the fire when the reach the saddle they had a direct and Clearview up the boulder Springs Ranch which appears to be very close as they start to drop down from the saddle their view of the fire was probably cut off until it disappeared completely the outflow boundary reach the southern perimeter of the fire at 16:30 because the drastic increase in wind speed and a shift in wind direction driving the fire cell the primary fire spread direction changed to the south buyer intensities and resulting plainly doubled well-read spread tripled the fire made a major run into the town if you're now the fire in the flat terrain East at the origin was affected by these changes in a dramatic way it moved from along the base at the main ridge and reach the bottom of a pool 1/2 miles south-southeast origin from there they had split into two heads the southern had entered the unnamed drainage refer to as the middle Paul the northern had continued burning along the base of the bridge Granite Mountain work their way down the slope through the boulders and brush until the freemen front cut them off from their escape route to the ranch the second had a fire burning along the base of the slope rounded in or composed of granite boulders once past the No the fire celebrated at entered the ball Granite Mountain with taking down read spread is estimated at ten to twelve miles per hour it is estimated that the time between the sighting at the fire front from the deployment side to the time the fire breached the deployment side with less than two minutes Granite Mountain made several radio transmissions before deploying fire shelters use them to you instructs the very large air tanker the LAT that is over the fire to orbit to the southeast into the ears and two ok it's Granite Mountain over the next four minutes hear them to make seven attempts to reach Granite Mountain to determine their location but as on able to establish contact upon hearing that the deployment dispatch and resources on the fire immediately initiate a medical response Blue Ridge I HD and other firefighters begin a ground search for Granite Mountain at 17:16 Ranger 58 in Arizona Department of Public Safety helicopter assigned to the fire marches to assist in the search Ranger 58 spots the Granite Mountain shelters at 1810 and Lance nearby an officer paramedic takes to the deployment site and confirms that none of the firefighters survived this tragedy on IIHT was traveling through an unburned area on a route toward the safety zone when a rapidly advancing fire upgrade intensity overtook them the fires extreme speed a ten to twelve miles per hour eliminated the cruise options reaching the safety zone are returning up to the canyon rim is left the crew less than two minutes to improve the shelter deployment site by using chain saws and burning out the crew was deploying their fire shelters close together in a small area when the fire overtook them the deployment site in the box canyon was not survivable because heavy brush has tracked when contact and temperatures exceeded 2000 agrees fahrenheit as the fire swept through the site the team developed a few conclusions based on available information from personal in the fire physical evidence cultural knowledge observations and subject matter expert sessions the Granite Mountain IIHT with the fully-qualified staffed entrained hotshot crew they were current with the required training and network rest guidelines yarnell Hill area having not seen wildfire in over 45 years was primed to burn because extreme drought decade in shop /url an above-average cured grass loadings although Yavapai County had a community wildfire protection plan many of the structures were not defendable by firefighters responding to the yarnell Hill Fire the fire destroyed over 100 structures radio communications were challenging throughout the incident some radios were not programmed with appropriate home guards crews identified the problem engaged in troubleshooting and developed workarounds so they could communicate using their radios radio traffic was heavy during critical times on the fire the fires complexity increased in a very short time challenging all firefighting resources to keep peace with the rapidly expanding incident as complexity dramatically increase starting Saturday evening fire management went through multiple transitions from a type or through type 1 incident in fewer than 20 hours the Granite Mountain crew had been watching the active fire burn away from their position all day but their observations did not lead them to anticipate the approaching outflow boundary or the company significant buyer behavioral changes these changes including a double in a fire intensity and plainly a 90-degree directional change and dramatically accelerated rate of spread the Granite Mountain I HC left the lunch spot and traveled south east on the to track road near the ridgetop then they descended from the to track road and took the most direct route towards Boulder Springs Ranch the team believes the crew was attempting to pre-position so they could be in gage Granite Mountain HD did not perceive excessive risk in repositioning to Boulder Springs Ranch there's no indication that they doubted the plaque with the ballot safety zone or that they moved to the border Springs Ranch because they feared for their safety if they stayed in the black in retrospect the important up the 1526 whether a it is clear however the update appears to have cared less relevant in the crew's decision making process perhaps due to the wind shift starting at about 1550 that preceded the outflow boundary or because at the time it took the outflow boundary to reach the south into the fire at 16:30 it is possible they may have interpreted the really when shipped as the anticipated wind event and air attack and/or in aerial supervision Marshall provided aerial supervision coverage throughout the day including at the time of the accident during some limited times aircraft were not available due to adverse weather conditions and refueling need at the time of the deployment the DC-ten caretaker was on station over the fire waiting to drop on the location up the deployment side once it was found although much communication occurred among crews throughout the day you people understood granite mountains intentions movements in location once they left the black deep of your is unimaginable the investigation team and the wildland fire community stance together with the families up the Granite Mountain interagency hotshots greeting heartbroken devastated our brothers Sun dad they're gone the current generation of firefighters has never experienced the tragedy such as yarnell and the Los up the Granite Mountain crew on that last day in June the family and firefighters alike one he answers to understand to make sense up this terrible outcome there is a gap of over 30 minutes in the information available granite mom I HT no crew members from the deployment fate survived we will never know specifically by the crew took the actions they did nor the thought process is being employed many discussion points to on insert in the report their situational awareness decision-making route of travel and motivation family members firefighters and many others will continue to pour over the circumstances up this tragedy for years to come much spot and analysis will go into reviewing this accident to understand to learn and to make sense of how and why this account the loss of nineteen firefighters our brothers is not complete and it never will be